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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENAWAY, JR. , District Judge. 
 
The critical issue before this Court is whether petitioner 
Dorsey Trailers, Inc. ("Dorsey") violated the National Labor 
Relations Act (the "Act") when it entered into a 
subcontracting agreement without first negotiating with its 
employees' union representatives. The National Labor 
Relations Board (the "Board" or "N.L.R.B.") reversed the 
Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") conclusion that no such 
violation existed. 
 
Dorsey now appeals the Board's Decision and Order 
which holds that Dorsey violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of 
the Act.1 Dorsey also appeals the Board's decision that it 
shall provide its union employees with lost overtime 
payments incurred as a result of the subcontracting 
violations. Cross-petitioner N.L.R.B. seeks enforcement of 
its order. This Court will grant the petition for review but 
will enforce the Board's Decision and Order in part. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
Dorsey manufactures platform and dump trailers in its 
Northumberland, Pennsylvania plant.2 The United Auto 
Worker's International and its Local 1868 (the "Union") is 
the exclusive bargaining representative for Dorsey's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Act states, in part: 
 
       (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-- 
 
       (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise 
       of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title; 
 
       . . . 
 
       (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of 
his 
       employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this 
title. 
 
29 U.S.C.A. SS 158(a)(1) & (5). 
 
2. Dorsey's other plants, which are not involved in this action, are 
located in Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina. 
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production, maintenance and stock room employees. 3 A 
collective bargaining agreement, effective from March 4, 
1992 to March 1, 1995, governed the relationship between 
Dorsey and the represented employees. 
 
On November 14, 1994, a trial was held before the 
Honorable Karl H. Buschmann, the administrative law 
judge assigned to this matter. The ALJ made the following 
findings of facts which provide the factual basis for our 
consideration:4 
 
       In 1993, in response to a rising backlog of work orders 
       and increasing customer demand, the petitioner 
       entered into an informal agreement with Bankhead 
       Enterprises in Atlanta, Georgia, an independent 
       company, which had the capability to produce flatbed 
       and dump trailers. Pursuant to this informal 
       agreement, the petitioner engineers the unit, purchases 
       the material, and ships the material . . . and 
       engineering packages to Bankhead, which then 
       supplies the labor for assembling the trailers. Prior to 
       this arrangement, the petitioner had only shipped out 
       parts for warranty purposes. Bankhead produces two 
       trailers per week for the petitioner's customers located 
       in Florida, Georgia, Tennessee, and North and South 
       Carolina. The informal agreement also provides that 
       Bankhead will not compete with the petitioner by 
       producing trailers on its own. Profits are apportioned 
       60 percent to the petitioners and 40 percent to 
       Bankhead. It is undisputed that the petitioner entered 
       into this agreement and effectuated the agreement 
       without prior notice to the Union and without 
       bargaining with the Union at any time. 
 
On August 9, 1993, the Union filed a "Charge Against 
Employer" with the Board alleging that Dorsey, in violation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. While Dorsey office's clerical and professional employees, salespeople, 
guards, watchmen and supervisors were not represented by Local 1868, 
the record is not clear as to what union, if any, represented this group 
of employees. 
 
4. We find that the ALJ's factual findings are supported by the record as 
a whole and we adopt them accordingly. See N.L.R.B. v. Alan Motor Lines, 
937 F.2d 887, 890 (3d Cir. 1991) and "Standard of Review" infra. 
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of sections 8(a)(1) and (5), engaged in unfair labor practices 
when it: 
 
       1) Unilaterally implemented revised "regular hours for 
       shifts," specified in the parties collective bargaining 
       agreement, and unilaterally revised contractual wages 
       for three employees working Sunday 11PM to Monday 
       7AM shift. Employer negotiated changes directly with 
       affected bargaining unit employees. The Employer also 
       has denied and/or failed to provide within a reasonable 
       time, relevant information which was requested in 
       connection with such changes. 
 
       2) Unilaterally implemented new job duties and the 
       wages for such for bargaining unit employees working 
       on what is referred to as light duty jobs. Employer 
       negotiated changes directly with affected bargaining 
       unit employees. The Employer has also denied and/or 
       failed to provide within a reasonable time, relevant 
       information which was requested in connection with 
       such changes. 
 
       3) Refused to bargain collectively with the undersigned 
       labor organization concerning bargaining unit work 
       being subcontracted and/or moved to Florida. The 
       Employer has also denied and/or failed to provide 
       within a reasonable time, relevant information which 
       was requested in connection with the movement 
       and/or subcontracting of such work. 
 
On April 29, 1994, the General Counsel for the Board 
filed a Complaint and Notice of Hearing against Dorsey. 
 
On February 15, 1995, the ALJ concluded that Dorsey's 
light duty transfer assignments, as well as its refusal to 
inform the Union of this practice, violated sections 8(a)(1) 
and (5). The ALJ dismissed the subcontracting element of 
the complaint premised upon his finding that the 
subcontracting agreement was not a subject of mandatory 
Union bargaining; however, he did find that Dorsey had 
violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) based upon its refusal to 
provide the Union with requested information relevant to 
the subcontracting agreement. 
 
The General Counsel and Dorsey filed exceptions to the 
ALJ decision and appealed to the Board. On July 5, 1996, 
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the Board issued a Decision and Order adopting, with 
modification, the findings of the ALJ. In major part, the 
modification found that the subcontracting agreement was 
a subject of mandatory Union bargaining. In so finding, the 
Board wrote: 
 
       that the Respondent's decision to subcontract work 
       was not a change in the "scope and direction" of its 
       business going to a core entrepreneurial concern, but 
       rather a direct replacement of the Northumberland unit 
       employees by the Bankhead employees to perform unit 
       work. 
 
Dorsey Trailers, Inc., Northumberland, Pa. Plant, 321 NLRB 
87, 88 (1996). The Board required Dorsey to rescind its 
subcontracting agreement. 
 
On July 16, 1996, Dorsey petitioned this Court to review 
and set aside the Board's Decision and Order; the Board 
filed a cross-application for enforcement of its Order. On 
August 29, 1996, this Court granted the Union leave to 
intervene. On September 6, 1996, the Board granted the 
General Counsel's Motion to Modify Board Order, thereby 
requiring Dorsey to: 
 
        Make whole its employees, with interest, for any loss 
       of earnings they may have suffered as a result of the 
       Respondent's unlawful subcontracting of bargaining 
       unit work, in the manner prescribed in Ogle Protection 
       Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th 
       Cir. 1971), and New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 
       NLRB 1173 (1987). 
 
        Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make 
       available to the Board or its agents for examination 
       and copying, all payroll records, social security 
       payment records, time cards, personnel records and 
       reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the 
       amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. 
 
Dorsey moves before this Court for a determination of 
whether there is substantial evidence to support the 
Board's findings that: (1) the agreement between Dorsey 
and Bankhead was a mandatory subject for bargaining 
under sections 8(a)(1) and (5); and (2) Dorsey must provide 
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lost overtime payments to employees affected by the 
Dorsey/Bankhead agreement. Dorsey raises no other issues 
and no other issues are before this Court.5 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
This Court shall employ plenary review as to matters of 
law. N.L.R.B. v. Greensburg Coca-Cola, 40 F.3d 669, 673 (3d 
Cir. 1995). We will, however, afford the Board's 
construction of a statute some deference. Id. Therefore, this 
Court will "enforce a Board order that rests on a 
construction of the [Act] that is not `an unreasonable or 
unprincipled construction of the statute.' " Id. (citations 
omitted); N.L.R.B. v. Alan Motor Lines, Inc., 937 F.2d 887, 
890 (3d Cir. 1991). Factual findings will be sustained if 
supported by the record as a whole. Alan Motor Lines, Inc., 
937 F.2d at 890. This includes evidence supportive of the 
Board's decision, as well as evidence critical of it. 
Greensburg, 40 F.3d at 672. 
 
III. PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
 
As a preliminary matter, we must first discuss the nature 
of the agreement entered into by Dorsey and Bankhead. 
The respondent defines the agreement as an agreement to 
subcontract. On the other hand, petitioner, during the 
November 14, 1994 trial, described the agreement as a joint 
venture. The resolution of this distinction may have certain 
consequences since the case law in this Court requires 
that, under specific circumstances, a company must 
bargain with a union before making a decision to 
subcontract.6 We agree with the ALJ's finding that the 
agreement is one to subcontract. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Dorsey does not contest the ALJ's and Board'sfindings that Dorsey's 
light duty transfer assignments, and its refusal to inform the union of 
this practice violate sections 8(a)(1) and (5). 
 
6. See Equitable Gas Co. v. N.L.R.B., 637 F.2d 980, 987 (3d Cir. 1981) 
("Thus, it is now settled in the jurisprudence of this Circuit that when 
issues of subcontracting and partial closings are confronted in the 
context of the National Labor Relations Act, an initial presumption arises 
that they are mandatory subjects of bargaining. . . . [T]his presumption 
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Subcontracts occur "[w]here a person has contracted for 
the performance of certain work and he in turn engages a 
third party to perform the whole or a part of that which is 
included in the original contract." Black's Law Dictionary 
324 (6th ed. 1990). A joint venture is a legal entity in the 
nature of a partnership. Ringier America, Inc. v. Land 
O'Lakes, Inc., 106 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 1997). It engages 
in the joint undertaking of a particular transaction for 
mutual profit, mutual control, mutual contribution and is 
memorialized in contract. Ringier, 106 F.3d at 828; 
Schiavone Const. Co. v. City of New York, 99 F.3d 546, 548- 
49 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 
Dorsey and Bankhead had a verbal agreement; there is 
no enforceable written contract. They did not form a 
separate legal entity and total control remained vested with 
Dorsey. Therefore, petitioner's insistence on defining the 
agreement as a joint venture is inappropriate. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
We now turn to the issue at hand - whether this 
particular subcontract is subject to mandatory union 
bargaining. 
 
One of the Act's fundamental purposes is the 
"establishment and maintenance of industrial peace to 
preserve the flow of interstate commerce." First National 
Maintenance Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981). 
This purpose is accomplished by requiring management 
and labor to enter into peaceful settlement negotiations 
when disputes arise, in some instances. Fibreboard Paper 
Prod. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964). 
 
In this vein, sections 8(a)(1) and (5) provide that it shall 
be an unfair labor practice for an employer to "refuse to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
can be overcome only if it appears that the employer's interests outweigh 
the union's interest in a given situation."); Brockway Motor Trucks, Div. 
Of Mack Trucks, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 582 F.2d 720, 727-31 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(Providing a Circuit wide history of subcontracting and its relationship 
to 
mandatory union bargaining concludes that "it seems fair to say that the 
NLRB has taken a pro-bargaining stance that is at odds with the results 
reached by and the language in the opinions of several courts.") 
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bargain collectively with the representatives of his 
employees . . . . " 29 U.S.C.A. S 158 (a) (West 1973). The 
obligation to bargain collectively is a mutual one. It requires 
the "employer and the representative of the employees to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment . . . . " 29 U.S.C.A. S 158(d) (West 1973). Our 
first issue for decision here is the proper interpretation of 
the words "other terms and conditions of employment" and 
whether the Dorsey/Bankhead subcontract falls within its 
confines. The Supreme Court's opinion in Fibreboard is 
instructive on this issue. 
 
In Fibreboard, the plaintiff subcontracted with a third 
party for maintenance work then being performed by 
Fibreboard's union employees. The High Court granted 
certiorari to determine: 
 
       Was petitioner [Fibreboard] required by the National 
       Labor Relations Act to bargain with a union 
       representing some of its employees about whether to 
       let to an independent contractor for legitimate business 
       reasons the performance of certain operations in which 
       those employees had been engaged? 
 
379 U.S. at 209. The Court, focusing in narrowly on the 
facts before it, wrote that it was concerned "only with 
whether the subject upon which the employer allegedly 
refused to bargain -- contracting out of plant maintenance 
work previously performed by employees in the bargaining 
unit, which the employees were capable of continuing to 
perform -- is covered by the phrase `other terms and 
conditions of employment' within the meaning of S 8(d)." Id. 
at 210. The Court held that management's decision to 
subcontract can be a condition of employment and, under 
the circumstances before it, the prerequisites which 
implicate "other terms and conditions of employment" were 
satisfied and that collective bargaining was required. Id. at 
209. 
 
In reaching its holding, the Court emphasized that 
Fibreboard's decision to subcontract did not affect its basic 
operations, nor was there an expenditure of capital 
required; rather, Fibreboard merely replaced Union workers 
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with those of its subcontractor. 379 U.S. at 213. 
Specifically, the Court wrote that it did 
 
       not [expand] the scope of mandatory bargaining to 
       hold, as we do now, that the type of `contracting out' 
       involved in this case -- the replacement of employees 
       in the existing bargaining unit with those of an 
       independent contractor to do the same work under 
       similar conditions of employment -- is a statutory 
       subject of collective bargaining under S 8(d). Our 
       decision need not and does not encompass other forms 
       of `contracting out' or `subcontracting' which arise daily 
       in our complex economy. 
 
379 U.S. at 215. In sum, a decision to subcontract is not 
necessarily subject to mandatory collective bargaining; 
whether such bargaining is mandatory can only be 
answered by looking to the reasons underlying 
management's decision to subcontract and the decision's 
impact upon the employment relationship. See First 
National Maintenance Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666, 676- 
78 (1981); see also Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 215 (The Court 
refused to hold broadly that all subcontracting agreements 
must be submitted to union bargaining; rather, each 
situation should be judged on its particular facts.) 
 
In First National, the Court further examined and defined 
the scope of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d). It concluded that 
Congress purposely left ambiguous "other terms and 
conditions of employment" in anticipation of specific 
industry practices. The Court wrote of three types of 
management decisions which impact on the employment 
relationship -- (1) those having only an indirect and 
attenuated impact on the employment relationship (i.e., 
advertising decisions); (2) those which are exclusively 
related to the employment relationship (i.e., layoff 
decisions); and (3) those which have a direct impact on 
employment, but whose focus is only on the economic 
profitability of the company. First National , 452 U.S. at 677 
(relying upon Fibreboard, Stewart, J., concurring). The third 
category addresses the scope and direction of the company 
and not primarily the conditions of employment. Id. 
 
The facts before this Court in the instant case lead us to 
conclude that we are confronted with a company's decision 
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to subcontract for economic reasons. As such, the third 
category, as set forth in First National above, most aptly fits 
here. 
 
When the third category is applicable, the courts have 
realized that 
 
       [m]anagement must be free from the constraints of the 
       bargaining process to the extent essential for the 
       running of a profitable business. . . . [I]n view of an 
       employer's need for unencumbered decision making, 
       bargaining over management decisions that have a 
       substantial impact on the continued availability of 
       employment should be required only if the benefit, for 
       labor-management relations and the collective- 
       bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on 
       the conduct of the business. 
 
452 U.S. at 679. Thus, it is 
 
       [n]ecessary to look behind the subcontracting decision 
       itself to the reasons motivating the decision. If the 
       employer's decision was prompted by factors that are 
       within the union's control and therefore suitable for 
       resolution within the collective bargaining framework, 
       then bargaining is mandatory. . . . [I]t is therefore 
       imperative to evaluate the factors which actually 
       motivated the employer's decisions. 
 
Furniture Rentors v. N.L.R.B., 36 F.3d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
The development of the case law alluded to above leads 
this Court to conclude that the Dorsey/Bankhead 
subcontract does not fall within the realm of "other terms 
and conditions of employment." We are mindful that certain 
subcontracting agreements must be submitted to union 
bargaining; however, we believe that the type of 
employment relationship involved here does not warrant 
union bargaining. 
 
The Board is correct in its finding that the work 
performed at Bankhead is the same type of work performed 
at the Northumberland plant. In both instances the 
relevant work is the building of trucks. But, in light of 
management's underlying reasons for subcontracting, i.e., 
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to avoid lost sales, this, without more, does not justify 
mandatory bargaining. Our review of the records and 
transcripts below convinces us that Dorsey's reasons for 
entering into a subcontracting agreement with Bankhead 
properly centered around the scope and direction of 
Dorsey's future viability. 
 
We have reviewed the transcript of the November 14, 
1994 hearing which took place before the ALJ. Of particular 
relevance is the testimony of both Michael A. Gordy 
("Gordy"), the Northumberland plant manager and Kenny 
Sawyer ("Sawyer"), Dorsey's Vice-President of Human 
Resources. 
 
On direct examination, Gordy testified that in 1993, the 
Northumberland plant, which was responsible for the 
production of platform and dump trailers, experienced 
difficulty in filling its orders.7  Gordy gave several reasons 
for the difficulty. 
 
First, while both trucks require welding in assembly, the 
dump truck is more welding intensive. In 1993, Dorsey was 
unable to find a qualified pool of experienced welders, i.e., 
mainly due to competition for the welders' talents from 
Dorsey's competitors, AC&F, Inc. (a railroad care 
manufacturer) and Strict Corp. (a trailer manufacturer). 
Competition was so severe that, at a point, no welders were 
available. In addition, Dorsey's paint department could not 
handle the volume of trucks which required painting prior 
to being transported to the buyer. This problem was 
particularly acute with dump trucks. 
 
Second, like many other businesses, the business of 
truck manufacturing is cyclical. In 1993, Dorsey was 
experiencing a high demand for its products. Gordy testified 
that from 1990-1992, business was so slow that Dorsey 
had to drop the number of its employees to under one 
hundred. In this slow market, the backlog for delivery of 
orders was approximately fifteen weeks for platform trucks 
and five weeks for dump trucks. However, when the market 
rose in 1993, the backlog escalated to approximately six 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The platform, also called a flatbed, is basically a 48-foot long 
trailer; 
a dump trailer is basically a box placed atop of the chassis. 
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months for dump trucks and a sell-out for the platform 
trucks. 
 
Feeling the pressure of possible lost sales, Dorsey's 
management decided to subcontract production to 
Bankhead. This decision was reached after management 
reviewed the lack of available manpower at the 
Northumberland plant and it implications for staffing an 
additional shift. Dorsey also considered the feasibility of 
building another plant or transferring some of the work to 
the Elba plant, located in Georgia. The former was rejected 
due to the cyclical nature of the business; the latter was 
rejected in light of the fact that Elba was already 
backlogged with its own production of vans. Freight costs 
were also a factor. Dump trucks must be driven to the 
buyer. This is an expensive endeavor and the cost 
sometimes outweighs the profit. Dorsey's other 
manufacturing plant, the Elba plant, was limited to the 
production of vans and reefers (a type of truck). Dorsey was 
rapidly losing business. Its competitors were filling orders 
in twelve to fifteen weeks, compared to Dorsey's backlog of 
approximately twenty-five weeks. It was within this 
framework that Dorsey decided to subcontract. Bankhead 
was chosen because of its southern location. The location 
offered a greatly reduced freight cost since the dump trucks 
made by Bankhead could be driven to buyers in the nearby 
states of Florida, Tennessee, the Carolinas and within 
Georgia, Bankhead's home state. Bankhead's proximity 
significantly reduced Dorsey's freight costs. Bankhead also 
had the capacity to build dump trucks, as well as prior 
experience in building dump trucks and welders. 
 
At first, Bankhead built a prototype for Dorsey; however, 
Bankhead and Dorsey later agreed that Bankhead would 
build four dump trucks for a Dorsey-specified vendor. The 
vendor had granted a contract to Dorsey for the production 
of twenty-eight dump trucks. Per Gordy, the 
Northumberland plant could not produce all twenty-eight in 
the time frame specified by the vendor. So, Dorsey shipped 
parts to Bankhead, who then assembled them. By 
subcontracting with Bankhead, Dorsey was able to satisfy 
the terms of the contract with the vendor, avert a layoff of 
Dorsey employees and hire additional workers. 
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This Court has also considered whether Dorsey's 
motivation behind the decision to subcontract lies solely in 
a desire to reduce and/or eliminate overtime. If such were 
the case, we would be forced to find that Dorsey's 
subcontracting agreement violated the mandatory 
bargaining requirement because Dorsey would have been 
replacing one set of workers, its union employees, for 
another, the Bankhead employees, "to do the same work 
under similar conditions of employment". Fibreboard, 379 
U.S. at 215. A company's decision to subcontract which is 
based solely on a desire to eliminate or reduce overtime is 
subject to mandatory union bargaining since to "require the 
employer to bargain about the matter would not 
significantly abridge his freedom to manage the business." 
Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 213-14. 
 
Once again, based on our review of the record below, this 
Court remains unconvinced that Dorsey's sole motivation 
was a desire to eliminate overtime at the Northumberland 
plant; rather, we believe that Dorsey's motivation lies in a 
need to fill orders and maintain a healthy, viable business. 
As we have previously recognized 
 
       employers may make business decisions based on 
       general "economic reasons," which "are not reasons 
       distinct and apart from a desire to decrease labor 
       costs," but that does not mean that labor costs are 
       somehow implicated by every employer's decision 
       intended to improve the business's bottom line. 
 
Furniture Rentors, 36 F.3d at 1249-50 (quoting from Arrow 
Automotive Indus., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 853 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 
1988)). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We find that Dorsey's agreement with Bankhead was not 
a change in the "scope and direction" of the company, nor 
was there an adverse impact on the bargaining unit. We 
further find that the subcontract is not a subject of 
mandatory bargaining. We will enforce those provisions of 
the Board's Decision and Order regarding light duty 
assignments. 
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The provision of the Board's Decision and Order which 
requires Dorsey to rescind its agreement with Bankhead 
will not be enforced nor will that provision of the Order 
which mandates that Dorsey provide overtime payment for 
hours which allegedly could have been performed by 
workers at the Northumberland plant. To the extent that we 
do not enforce the Order, we will grant the petition for 
review. We make no prospective decision as to any other 
subcontracting agreement which Dorsey may enter in the 
future. The parties will bear their own costs on this appeal. 
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